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Introduction
By STANLEY MOSK*
I suppose it should come as no great surprise to discover that politi-
cians often do not mean what they publicly profess. Nevertheless, I still
marvel at how frequently leaders of our government, from presidents to
members of Congress, talk about limiting the powers of the national gov-
ernment and returning authority to the states-and then proceed time
and time again to preempt the rights of the states to decide issues involv-
ing their own citizens. Reading politicians' lips doesn't reveal what is on
their minds.
In the 1850s, until the Civil War, states' rights seemed to be
designed primarily to protect slavery. When the civil rights movement
developed in the Martin Luther King, Jr. era, states' rights became asso-
ciated with George Wallace and Orval Faubus, who spoke of nullifica-
tion, the right of the states to reject federal law. Fortunately we are long
past that period of confrontation. Parenthetically, I must confess to get-
ting perverse delight these days in recalling Wallace standing in the door-
way of the University of Alabama to prevent black students from
entering, as I tune in on Saturday TV and watch the current University
of Alabama football team, with a black quarterback and a majority of
black players.
Recalcitrant states were undoubtedly compelled to accord equal
rights to all citizens regardless of skin color because of the vigilance of
the federal government. That is because the federal government may set
minimum constitutional standards. On the other hand, however, the
whim of federal government should not foreclose the states from exercis-
ing internal power.
In modern times every president and every candidate for president
of both parties has promised to limit the federal government, to curtail
federal bureaucracy, and to return government to the people at the state
and local levels. Richard Nixon made that pledge. Jimmy Carter, a rank
outsider, campaigned against Washington on behalf of the outsiders in
the states. Ronald Reagan, too, promised to get the federal government
off our backs and to return authority to the states and localities. He
* Justice, California Supreme Court.
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
grandly termed his the "new federalism." On January 23, 1989, Presi-
dent Bush spoke to the anti-abortion demonstrators:1 reverse Roe v.
Wade,2 he urged, and deliver the problem to the states. 3 Even Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist joined that repetitive chorus. In his February 1989 talk to
the ABA in Denver, he said, "We are in A position where we must think
not about creating new federal causes of action, but of remitting to state
courts some of the business now handled by the federal courts. ... 4
Not only do presidential candidates make those pronouncements
during their campaigns and tenure of office, but most senators and con-
gressmen of both parties echo the same pledge. Yet no sooner do mem-
bers of Congress get off the plane at Dulles Airport than they pass
measures to increase the powers of the federal government, and presi-
dents dutifully sign the measures. In field after field, they have passed
laws which purport to preempt the rights of states, and even in some
areas in which their intent is not clearly specified, federal courts have
completed the preemptive task for them.
Although this may prove to be a cure for your insomnia, let me
review some of the subjects in which states' rights have been curtailed on
a theory of federal preemption. At the outset it may be helpful to men-
tion the general circumstances in which federal preemption applies.
Case law attributes Congress' power to preempt state laws to the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI of the Federal Constitution,5 but I per-
ceive Article I, section 8, clause 18, as more relevant.6 However, it is
broadly asserted-though frequently ignored-that preemption is not fa-
vored unless Congress has unmistakably so ordained, or the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits the courts no other conclusion. 7
In determining whether federal law preempts similar or conflicting
state constitutions and laws, a reviewing court must look to congres-
sional intent. Congress has assumed the authority to explicitly define the
1. Los Angeles Times, Jan. 24, 1989, part 1, at 19, col. 1.
2. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3. Cf Boston Globe, Jan. 23, 1989, at 1.
4. Rehnquist Urges Limits on Burden of Federal Courts, MANHATrAN LAWYER, Feb.
14-Feb. 20, 1989, at 16.
5. "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance thereof... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby .. " U.S. CONST art. VI.
6. "The Congress shall have Power... to make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested in this
Constitution, in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208
(1985).
7. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
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extent to which its enactments preempt state law. Generally relying on
the Commerce Clause, it categorically declares that the proposed law is
intended to displace competing state law'. Although such an explicit in-
tent is rare, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)9 is
a notable example of such a manifest purpose, explicitly preempting any
state law which relates to an employee benefit plan.1
In the absence of such explicit statutory language, courts are left to
determine whether Congress implicitly indicated an intent to occupy the
whole field of a given area, to the exclusion of state law. Such a purpose
may be inferred when the pervasive nature of the federal regulation pre-
cludes supplementation by the states, when the federal interest in the
field is so dominant as to preclude the enforcement of state constitutions
or laws on the same subject, or when "the object sought to be obtained by
the federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it...
reveal the same purpose."11
Finally, even when Congress has not entirely displaced state regula-
tion in a particular field, federal courts hold that state law may be pre-
empted if it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict will be
found when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, 2
or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
Congress' objectives13 .
I. Federal Laws with Preemptive Effect
From the foregoing analysis it appears that a determination of fed-
eral preemption is, in the absence of explicit congressional intent, an ad
hoc process which depends on the unique facts of each case. Thus, let me
give you a small, though probably representative, sample of some federal
laws that the U.S. Supreme Court has determined have preemptive effect.
Many of these cases are quite recent, revealing that the trend is
continuing.
A. Employee Retirement Security Act
As I mentioned above, ERISA is perhaps the most notable and fre-
quently litigated federal act that preempts competing state law. 4 The
8. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1982 & Supp V 1987).
10. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987).
11. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Fidelity Fed. Say.
& Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152-54 (1982).
12. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
13. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
14. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
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statute declares that regulation of employee pension plans is exclusively a
federal concern,15 and thus ERISA preempts all state laws that relate to
a qualified employee benefit plan. 6 ERISA has been held to preempt an
employee's common law tort and contract claims arising from an em-
ployer's insurer's termination of benefits under an ERISA plan.17 Simi-
larly, state common law claims for bad faith insurance practices do not
come within ERISA's "insurance savings clause" and thus are pre-
empted by ERISA's exclusive civil enforcement procedures.18
Mentioning Pilot Life is not good for my blood pressure. My dissent
in Commercial Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court 19 ventured the view that a
United States Supreme Court opinion, such as Pilot Life, based almost
entirely on "common sense" as authority, is hardly helpful to the bench,
the bar, or the public. After all, common sense is in the eye, or the mind,
of the beholder. I also emphasized the exceptions provided in ERISA
which should permit state action, when based entirely on state laws.
B. Labor Law
At the risk of stepping on a land mine, I venture into the field in
which Professor Grodin is the preeminent expert. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA)2 ° gives the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) primary jurisdiction to consider in the first instance what con-
duct is prohibited or protected by the NLRA.2' States are prohibited
from regulating activity that the NLRA protects, prohibits, or arguably
protects or prohibits.22 Applying this standard, the Supreme Court re-
cently held that the NLRA preempts a state common law tort action for
interference with an employment contract because such a cause of action
is arguably within the ambit of the NLRA.23
Moreover, under the authority of the NLRA, states are preempted
from regulating conduct that Congress intended to leave unregulated.24
15. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522-
23 (1981); see generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1001(a) (1982).
16. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2182, 2185 (1988).
17. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 62 (1987).
18. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 57 (1987).
19. 47 Cal. 3d 473, 485, 253 Cal. Rptr. 682, 689, 764 P.2d 1059, 1066 (1988) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
20. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
21. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 748 (1985) (citing Bel-
knap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 498-99 (1983)).
22. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246 (1959).
23. Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
24. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132, 141 (1976).
[Vol. 17:1
Consequently, the Supreme Court has held that states cannot prohibit
secondary boycotts, 25 overtime limitations,2 6 or other conduct that Con-
gress has determined should be controlled only by market forces.2 7
Nevertheless, the absolute preemptive effect of the NLRA is uncer-
tain; all is not lost. Not all state laws or regulations which may affect
labor-management relations appear to be preempted by the primary ju-
risdiction, of the NLRB. For example, the NLRA does not prohibit
states from providing unemployment benefits to striking union mem-
bers.2 8 Similarly, allowing management or union members to bring suit
on the basis of state law claims such as breach of contract,2 9 trespass, 30 or
intentional inffiction of emotional distress, 31 does not implicate activity
arguably within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Finally, a state law re-
quiring an employer to give her employees severance pay if her plant
unexpectedly closes does not run afoul of the NLRA's preemptive effect,
despite the fact that such a law aids people covered by the act.32
In addition to the NLRA, other federal laws affecting workers'
rights preempt state laws. For example, section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA)33 preempts all state laws, or
state law claims, that affect the interpretation of collective bargaining
agreements. 34 Also, the Railroad Labor Act 35 preempts all state laws
banning union security agreements.36
C. Laws Affecting Indians
Because the regulation of Indian tribes is a subject constitutionally
committed to the federal government, state laws regulating, taxing, or
otherwise interfering with the sovereign rights of tribal organizations are
preempted by federal law.37 To this end, the Supreme Court recently
held that (1) the Pueblo Lands Act of 192431 prohibits states from regu-
25. Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260
(1964).
26. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin, 427 U.S. at 149-51.
27. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 750 (1984).
28. New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dep't of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979).
29. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 511-12 (1983).
30. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 207 (1978).
31. Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977).
32. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 23 (1987).
33. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).
34. Allis Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 151-163 (1982).
36. Railroad Employees' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956).
37. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 152 (1982).
38. 43 Stat. 636, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1982).
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lating non-Indians' commercial transactions with the Pueblo Indians;39
(2) states may not tax a tribe's royalty interest in oil and gas leaseholds
granted under the Indian Mineral Leasing Act;' and (3) states may not
tax non-Indian companies performing essential services mandated by fed-
eral regulations on Indian reservations.41 The California Supreme Court
even refused to allow prosecution for violating state fish and game laws
and depleting a state natural resource on a stream running through an
Indian reservation.42
D. Laws Affecting Aliens
Legislation affecting aliens is also the exclusive responsibility of the
federal government. Thus, federal laws regulating aliens preempt state
laws that burden aliens in a manner not contemplated by Congress.4 3
E. Laws Affecting Military Operations
State law cannot be used to limit the national purpose of providing
for the common defense. Provisions of the Servicemen's Group Life In-
surance Act44 that provide service people the right to freely designate
their beneficiaries, preempt inconsistent state laws such as forced share
provisions of a state's probate code.45  Finally, the Supreme Court re-
cently held that the Federal Tort Claims Act4 6 preempted a state law
imposing tort liability on a military contract, and concluded that such
claims are within the immune, discretionary function provisions of the
act.47
F. Federal Regulatory Agencies
The crowning affront, it seems to me, is that even federal regulations
39. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 250-51 (1985).
40. 25 U.S.C. §§ 396-416, 2101-2108 (1982); see California v. Cabazon Band of Mission
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 215 n.17 (1987).
41. Ramah Navajo School Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845 (1982); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 149 (1980).
42. Mattz v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 3d 355, 250 Cal. Rptr. 278, 758 P.2d 606 (1988).
43. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1 (1982) (Maryland law charging nonresident tui-
tion for resident aliens preempted by federal law); Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (federal
law preempts Texas classification of aliens that excluded children of illegal aliens from public
schools). But see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (California law barring employment to
illegal aliens was harmonious with Immigration and Naturalization Act, hence not
preempted.).
44. 38 U.S.C. § 770(a) (1982).
45. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 56 (1981).
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982).
47. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 108 S. Ct. 2510, 2517 (1988).
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may preempt state laws in the same manner as federal statutes.48 Here is
a brief list of recent action by federal regulatory agencies which has pre-
empted state law:
L Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
The FERC has the authority to set rates for the interstate sale of
natural gas, electricity and other energy sources. 49 It has exclusive juris-
diction to regulate wholesale interstate utility rates.50 A state is not free
to set rates that do not conform to the FERC rates.5 Further, when
state regulations affect the Commission's ability to regulate the interstate
transportation and/or sale of natural gas, state law is preempted. 2
2. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The Federal Aviation Act,53 which provides that all transfers of air-
craft must be recorded with the FAA, preempts state law allowing an
unrecorded transfer of title to an aircraft. 4
3. Federal Home Loan Bank Board
Board regulations allowing federally chartered savings and loans to
enforce due-on-sale clauses in mortgages preempt conflicting state law
here in California, which prohibits such clauses. 55
4. Federal Communications Commission
FCC regulations concerning the operational aspects of cable televi-
sion signals preempt competing state standards. 56
G. Laws Affecting the Environment
Some federal environmental legislation has been found to have pre-
emptive effect. Thus, while the Court liberally construed the Clean
48. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 797, 824 (1982).
50. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (1982).
51. Nantahala Power v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986).
52. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline, 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (preemptive effect of FERC regu-
lations limits a state's ability to regulate a utility's sale of its own securities, when such regula-
tion will affect an area within FERC's jurisdiction); Arkansas Lousiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453
U.S. 571 (1981) (state courts cannot award recovery on a contract rate that exceeds the rate
filed with FERC).
53. 49 App. U.S.C. §§ 1301-1557 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
54. Philko Aviation, Inc. v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406, 410 (1983).
55. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982).
56. New York v. F.C.C., 486 U.S. 57 (1988).
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Water Act5 7 to accommodate stricter, competing state legislation, it
nonetheless recently invalidated a Vermont nuisance action, which
sought to impose liability on an unclean New York point source, as in-
consistent with the act.58 Similarly, while the Court has acknowledged
that states may regulate the safety aspects of nuclear facilities,59 it has
also held that the Atomic Energy Act 60 preempts state law regulating the
disposal of hazardous nuclear waste.61 Finally, the Court has ruled that
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 197762 preempts
state laws regulating coal producers when the state law actually conflicts
with federal law.63
In 1986 the people of California overwhelmingly passed Proposition
65, which requires businesses to provide a warning if their chemicals pose
a significant risk of cancer, birth defects, or other reproductive harm.
That certainly seems reasonable enough. Nevertheless, there are three
lawsuits pending in federal courts asserting that the proposition violates a
federal law that prescribes the labels to be placed on pesticides.
H. Other Miscellaneous Preemption Cases
1. Federal Arbitration Act
The Federal Arbitration Act" preempts state laws that withdraw
the power to enforce arbitration agreements under the Act,65 or that al-
low state law actions to be maintained without regard for a private agree-
ment to arbitrate.66
2. The Williams Act
The Williams Act,67 which regulates takeovers of companies listed
on a national security exchange, preempts inconsistent state regulation
that may inhibit takeovers. 8
57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
58. International Paper Co. v. Ouelette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987).
59. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 258 (1984).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
61. P.G. & E. v. State Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 219 (1983).
62. 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
63. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981).
64. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
65. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
66. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 490-91 (1987).
67. 82 Stat. 454 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d) (f) (1982)).
68. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 639 (1982).
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3. Agricultural Fair Practices Act
The Agricultural Fair Practices Act 69 may preempt state laws regu-
lating agricultural associations.70
4. The Hague Service Convention
When applicable, The Hague Service Convention, a multilateral
treaty, providing uniform standards for international service of process,
preempts inconsistent state law.7
5. Social Security Act
Provisions of the Social Security Act7' exempting benefits from exe-
cution, levy, or attachment preempt conflicting state laws designed to
attach a prisoner's social security benefits to pay for his incarceration.73
6. The Wild-Free Roaming Horses & Burros Act
This Act74 may also have preemptive effect.75
II. Laws That Explicitly Do Not Have Preemptive Effect
There are a few, very few, bright spots. For as Congress may explic-
itly provide for federal preemption, it may also explicitly limit the pre-
emptive effect of federal laws by signaling an intention to accommodate
consistent, or even stricter, state laws that further the purpose of the
complimentary federal law. For example, under the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act,76 states are free to adopt more stringent water pollu-
tion standards, above and beyond those set by the act.77 Similarly, the
preemption sections of the Civil Rights Act 78 severely limit Title VII's
preemptive effect by allowing state fair employment laws to have the
same effect as they had before the enactment of Title VII.79 Finally, as I
have consistently insisted, beginning in an article published over twenty
years ago, federal law does not automatically preempt state antitrust
69. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2306 (1982).
70. Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467
U.S. 461, 478 (1984).
71. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 108 S. Ct. 2104, 2108 (1988).
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1982).
73. Bennett v. Arkansas, 108 S. Ct. 1204, 1205 (1988).
74. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
75. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 540-41 (1976).
76. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
77. 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (1982).
78. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982).
79. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 282 (1987).
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laws.8 0 That can be particularly significant in a state like California
which has a very good antitrust statute, the Cartwright Act. 1
Conclusion
After all of the foregoing, what is my conclusion? No, it is not se-
cession from the union. I am not declaring war on the feds. I hope only
that the federal government will exercise restraint rather than running
roughshod over legitimate efforts of the states to regulate the affairs of
their own citizens.
One possible solution is contained in an interesting academic debate
between Professor Erwin Chemerinsky of the University of Southern
California and Professor Martin Redish of Northwestern University. 2 It
is not actually a true debate, for they agree on substance, disagreeing
only on some peripheral matters.
The general theme is that litigants should be able to choose between
federal and state courts for the determination of constitutional issues.
Professor Chemerinsky contends that the litigant choice principle has
many advantages.8 3 First, permitting a party with a constitutional claim
to choose whether to litigate in federal or state court improves the oppor-
tunity for protecting constitutional rights. The state and federal courts
throughout the country vary considerably. In a nation with fifty state
court systems and ninety-one federal districts, it is evident that some
state courts will be superior to some federal courts in protecting individ-
ual rights, while in other areas, the state courts will be inferior to the
federal judiciary. Actually, the courts probably vary depending on the
particular issue; a state court might be better in upholding some constitu-
tional rights, but ineffective as to others.
The litigant choice principle allows a party with a constitutional
claim to choose between state or federal court and thus to select the fo-
rum likely to provide the most understanding hearing. The litigant and
80. See Mosk, State Antitrust Enforcement and Coordination with Federal Enforcement,
21 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION 358, 361-68 (1962).
81. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16720-16727 (1989). But see State ex rel. Van de Kamp
v. Texaco, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 1170, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221, 235, 762 P.2d 385, 399 (1988)
(Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing against holding of majority, id. at 1168, 252 Cal.Rptr. at 234,
762 P.2d at 398, that Cartwright Act is not broader than Sherman Act and common law on
the question of merger coverage).
82. Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36
UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988); Redish, Judicial Parity, Litigant Choice, and Democratic Theory:
A Comment on Federal Jurisdiction and Constitutional Rights, 36 UCLA L. REv. 329 (1988);
Chemerinsky, Federal Courts, State Courts, and the Constitution: A Rejoinder to Professor
Redish, 36 UCLA L. REv. 369 (1988).
83. See Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered, supra note 82.
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his attorney are in the optimal position to assess which court in that
geographic area offers the better chance of objectively vindicating the
particular constitutional claim. Of course, mere exercise of the choice of
forum does not determine whether federal or state constitutional law will
control.
Although I have merely scratched the surface, I hope you received
my message: I am not enthused about federal preemption. I prefer to
allow the states to be, as Brandeis put it, laboratories in the science of
self-government. And so, on states' rights I conclude with the views of
Professor Dick Howard of the University of Virginia, who recently wrote
that a state constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to
record their moral values, their definition of justice, their hopes for
the common good. A state constitution defines a way of life....
A study of constitutionalism in the United States is incom-
plete if one considers only the Federal Constitution. That docu-
ment deserves all the attention we can give it. But those who
drafted it understood that an enduring and viable federal system
rested as well on the pillars of the state constitutions. It is through
those constitutions that the people of the respective states structure
governments closer to them than is possible in Washington. Plu-
ralism and a dispersal of power are among the buttresses of our
free society. Maintaining the state constitutions in good repair,
and understanding their postulates, are important in carrying for-
ward a system of government that has served us well for two cen-
turies and gives us hope and promise for the next century and
beyond. 84
84. Howard, The Renaissance of State Constitutional Law, 63 U. VA. INST. OF GOV'T
NEWSL., Sept. 1986, at 5 (published by University of Virginia Center for Public Service).
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